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The use of patient data by the NHS raises significantimplications for patient privacy, particularly in thelight of developments such as the automation of
patient data and genetic databases. Patient information
may be sought for a broad range of purposes ranging from
education and research to administration and clinical
audit. The privacy of patient information is protected both
by the common law action for breach of confidence and by
the data protection legislation. This article will focus on
how successful the former is in protecting privacy by
assessing the extent to which it facilitates the control by
patients over the use and disclosure of personal
information.
Since the incorporation of the European Convention on
Human Rights into UK law, the action for breach of
confidence has been subject to rapid development to
accommodate Article 8 privacy rights. Whereas previously
it was unclear whether damages could be awarded for
distress alone, a recent decision of the Court of Appeal did
award such damages against a doctor, affirming the
decision of the judge at first instance that to fail to do so
would deprive a complainant of an adequate remedy and
thus breach her Article 8 rights (Cornelius v de Taranto
[2002] EMLR 6 affirming [2001] EMLR 12 at [65]–[77]).
As a result, the action for breach of confidence has the
potential to provide a significant remedy for misuse of
patient information. Despite this, it can be argued that it
currently provides inadequate protection for patient
privacy. There are two reasons for this.
Firstly, although it is sometimes argued that the purpose
of the law of confidentiality is to protect patient autonomy
by protecting patients’ ability to exercise control over
personal information, it will be seen that the common law
has failed to grant patients effective control over the use
and disclosure of their medical records (see for example, G
Phillipson, H Fenwick, “Breach of Confidence as a Privacy
Remedy in the Human Rights Act Era” (2000) 63 MLR
660; I Kennedy “The Doctor, the Pill and the Fifteen Year
Old Girl”, in I Kennedy (ed.) Treat Me Right (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1989) p 113). Secondly recent legislative
developments in the form of section 60 of the Health and
Social Care Act 2001 and the Health Service (Control of
Patient Information) Regulations 2002 have reduced such
control as had been permitted and restricted the scope of
the common law.
In theory the common law permits patients to control
information by requiring that their consent is obtained
before it is used. If a patient consents either expressly or
impliedly to the release of information there is no breach
of confidentiality. Consent will be implied where it is
reasonable to conclude from the patient’s conduct that
consent has been given or that the patient makes no
objection to the proposed course of action ( I Kennedy, A
Grubb Medical Law, London, Butterworths, 2000 at pp
591,1085). In so far as use of patient data is justified on the
basis of implied consent, it removes control of that data
from patients who may in fact have no knowledge or
understanding of the uses entailed. Despite this, implied
consent has been relied upon to justify a wide range of uses
within the NHS although there is scant legal authority for
such reliance (The Protection and Use of Patient Information,
London: DoH,1996; GMC Confidentiality: Protecting and
Providing Information (2000) paras 7–10,16,24,29–30).
A further problem in asserting that patients control their
medical records is the manner in which the concept of
public interest has been used to override that control. It is
a defence to an action for breach of confidentiality that
disclosure is in the public interest (Attorney General v
Guardian Newspapers (No 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 per Lord Goff
at 282; X v Y [1988] 2 All ER 648; W v Egdell [1990] 1 All
ER 835) which includes disclosure to prevent or report
crime (W v Egdell [1990] 1 All ER 835)); disclosure in the
interests of justice; (A-G v Mulholland [1963] 1 All ER 767)
disclosure in the interests of free speech (A v B Plc [2002]
3 WLR 542) and disclosure to prevent the risk of serious
harm or death (W v Egdell [1990] 1 All ER 835).
Disclosure of patient data to avert a real risk of harm to
the public falls within this exception, including disclosure
to regulatory bodies and to the police, for example in child
abuse cases or where the competence or integrity of a
healthcare professional, and so patient safety, is in issue
(Woolgar v Chief Constable of the Sussex Police [1999] 3 All ER
604). In determining whether disclosure can proceed on
this basis a balance must be struck between competing
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public and private interests, including the interest in the
maintenance of medical confidentiality and the interest in
protecting the public against risk (W v Egdell [1990] 1 All
ER 835 at 845–846 per Sir Stephen-Brown P, at 848 per
Bingham LJ; Woolgar v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [1999]
3 All ER 604 at 615).
If a health care professional takes a decision to disclose
information which is made in accordance with
professional/governmental guidance, it is unlikely that a
court would criticise it (W v Egdell [1990] 1 All ER 835: see
discussion at 851, per Bingham LJ: in assessing whether a
disclosure was justified, close attention was paid to the
guidance set out in the Blue Book and the doctor’s
professional judgment). This is significant because the
most recent GMC guidance on confidentiality permits
disclosures to take place for a wide range of reasons in the
public interest and, as noted, on grounds of implied
consent. (GMC Confidentiality: Protecting and Providing
Information, 2000, paras 18–20,25–26,31,36–37.)
In addition, there are signs that the courts are
increasingly willing to use a public interest justification to
override patient control of medical information. For
example in A Health Authority v X [2001] UKHRR 1213 at
least one patient objected to the release of their records in
the course of an investigation into a GP’s practice. The
judge at first instance ruled that where documents were to
be used otherwise than in the patient’s best interests, such
as for disciplinary or regulatory procedures, there had to
be a compelling public interest in their disclosure (ibid at
1237). Furthermore as disclosure would breach a patient’s
Article 8 rights, any argument based upon public interest
had to show that disclosure was necessary to meet the aims
set out in Article 8(2), in particular public safety, the
protection of health and morals and the rights and
freedoms of others, and the nature and extent of the
disclosure had to be a proportionate response to that aim
(ibid at 1237–39). Here a compelling public interest lay in
the need for the Health Authority to investigate whether
the care provided by GPs was adequate so as to protect the
public and individual patients (ibid at 1230–1231, 1238,
applying Woolgar v Chief Constable of Sussex Police [1999] 3 All
ER 604). The decision was subsequently affirmed by the
Court of Appeal although the public interest was identified
as being that in the proper administration of disciplinary
proceedings([2002] 2 All ER 780 at 786 per Thorpe LJ).
The finding that disclosures for both regulatory and
disciplinary purposes may be justifiable by reference to the
public interest has unwelcome implications for patient
autonomy. In the earlier case of Woolgar the adult who had
opposed disclosure had been an alleged or potential
wrongdoer and could be viewed as having forfeited or
weakened their claim to confidentiality. The law will not
preserve the secrecy of a wrongdoing (AG v Guardian
Newspapers Ltd (No. 2) [1990] 1 AC 109 at 268–69 per
Lord Griffiths, at 282 per Lord Goff) nor will equity grant
a remedy if the complainant is guilty of improper conduct
(Hubbard v Vosper [1972] 2 QB 84). However in the case of
X, patient confidentiality was violated and patient ability to
control the use of medical information overridden even
though the patients were not connected with any
wrongdoing.
A further concern is that the identification in A Health
Authority v X of the public interest with Article 8(2)
requirements might weaken the domestic protection of
patient confidentiality by legitimating and confirming a
wide interpretation of the requirements of the public
interest, to mirror the European Court’s approach to
Article 8(2). The level of protection afforded to patient
privacy at Convention level is weak. This can be seen in
particular in the case of MS v Sweden (1999) 28 EHRR 313
which was extensively relied on in A Health Authority v X.
This case indicated that decisions authorising the release of
medical information for regulatory or administrative
reasons are likely to be justifiable under Article 8(2) at
European level.
The role of the public interest in undermining patient
control of their medical records and subsequently patient
privacy can be seen further in legislative developments
which have legitimated a wide range of uses within the
NHS and restricted the ambit of the common law.
SECTION 60: AUTHORISATION AND THE
HEALTH SERVICE (CONTROL OF PATIENT
INFORMATION) REGULATIONS 2002
The controversial section 60 of the Health and Social
Care Act 2001 (‘2001 Act’) allows for regulations to be
made to permit the disclosure of patient information for
medical purposes (for a definition see s60(10)) without
consent. This can occur where disclosure is necessary or
expedient in the interests of improving patient care or in
the public interest (s60(1)).
On 23 May 2002, The Health Service (Control of
Patient Information) Regulations (SI 2002/1438: ‘the
Regulations’) were approved by Parliament. These provide
class authorisation for the disclosure of patient data
without consent in three main categories of case which
include disclosures to Cancer Registries, (s2) disclosures
made for monitoring public health (s3) and a list of
Scheduled uses which include disclosures for medical
research and to carry out auditing and monitoring of the
provision of health care (s5).
To safeguard patient’s rights, a new body was created,
the Patient Information Advisory Group (“PIAG”) whose
role is to represent patients’ interests and to advise the
Government on the use of powers under section 60 (s61)
including advising the Secretary of State on whether
applications under the Schedule to the Regulations and
directly under section 60 of the Act should succeed (s61 of
2001 Act, s5 of the Regulations). 27
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The Regulations are of concern because they remove
control of the use and disclosure of patient data from
patients for a wide range of purposes in the name of the
public interest. There is no provision for patient opt-out
and although a public register will be maintained of some
of the authorised uses, it will not be comprehensive. For
example, it will not include information concerning
disclosures to monitor public health. Patients will not
therefore know who is making use of their information and
for what specific purpose. Subsequently any challenge, legal
or political, to such use will be difficult. In addition the
legislation grants patients no remedy if their information is
misused and where a use is supported by the legislation,
the Regulations provide that there will be no breach of the
duty of confidentiality even though patients may object to
the use (s4).
The Regulations therefore restrict the scope of the law
of confidentiality and reduce patient rights to control and
challenge the use of personal information. It might be
argued that patient privacy will be protected through PIAG.
It has exercised its role reasonably robustly so far (of 11
applications for section 60 support, it has approved six.
The remainder were either rejected or advised to submit
revised applications: Minutes 10 December 2001, PIAG 1-
02/2002; Minutes 8 March 2002, PIAG 202/2002:
http://www.doh.gov.uk/confiden). On the other hand,
PIAG has a purely advisory role. It is not clearly
independent of the executive: its members are appointed
not by patient groups but by the Secretary of State and it
appears to have a close relationship with the Department
of Health. The extent to which it will be active in
protecting patient rights and patient privacy therefore
remains to be seen. In addition even accepting that the
introduction of PIAG is to be welcomed, it remains the
case that its introduction was a legitimising part of an
initiative the effect of which was to restrict patient rights by
removing decisions about the control of patient
information from patients.
CONCLUSION
The requirement of patient consent and the ability of
patients to control the use of information which they
impart in confidence to their health carer appears to have
been sacrificed by both the courts and the legislature in the
name of the public interest. This is of concern both
because when information is disclosed without patient
consent there is an infringement of patient autonomy, and
because the pressures upon patient privacy are such that
unless a patient’s right to confidentiality is given greater
protection there is a risk that patient privacy will be
whittled away. It is currently too easy to argue successfully
that disclosures of patient information should take place in
the public interest. In the case of R v Department of Health ex
parte Source Informatics Ltd [2001] QB 424 it was argued that
the disclosure of patient data to pharmaceutical companies
was in the public interest because not only did it permit
the companies to target their marketing more effectively, it
allowed them to keep doctors better informed of the
products available (at 432). Although the court did not
have to rule on this argument (it found that there had been
no breach of confidentiality), it illustrates the kind of
challenges posed to a weak right to confidentiality which
denies patients control over personal information. In order
to better protect patient privacy from such pressures, the
law must place greater emphasis on the requirement of
consent and patients’ rights of control over the flow of
confidential personal information.
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